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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal involves a contract dispute arising under 
New Jersey law. Appellant Mid-American Salt, LLC 
contracted with the Morris County Cooperative Pricing 
Council to provide its members with bulk rock salt at 
negotiated prices. But several of the Council’s members bought 
no salt from Mid-American and others bought salt from its 
competitors at lower prices. Finding itself sitting on a pile of 
unsold salt, Mid-American sued the Council and almost fifty 
of its members. The District Court denied Mid-American relief 
and this appeal followed.  
I 
 The Council was established in 1974 under New Jersey 
law, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:11–10. It consists of over 200 
New Jersey counties, municipalities, police departments, and 
school districts. The Council bids, awards, and executes 
contracts for products and services so its members can obtain 
volume discounts. At all times relevant to this appeal, the 
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Township of Randolph served as the lead agency that managed 
the Council’s affairs.  
 Mid-American is an Indiana limited liability company 
that imports and sells bulk road salt. According to Mid-
American’s amended complaint, the Council asked its 
members to estimate their rock salt needs for the 2016-17 
winter. Based on those estimates, the Council issued a 
comprehensive bid package in the summer of 2016, in 
accordance with New Jersey law, anticipating the need for 
some 115,000 tons of rock salt. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40A:11-11; N.J. ADMIN. CODE 5:34-7.9–7.12. Mid-
American was awarded the contract the following month.  
Mid-American agreed to supply bulk rock salt to the 
Council’s members in accordance with the terms and prices set 
forth in the contract. The bid specifications incorporated in the 
contract state: 
This is an Open-Ended contract, meaning all 
items are specified with an estimated 
quantity. There is no obligation to purchase 
that quantity during the contract period, and 
the actual quantity purchased by members of 
the [Council] may vary. 
All quantities may be more or less than 
estimated. No minimum order requirements are 




App. 280 (bold in original). All parties agree that the executed 
contract, including the bid package, provided only estimated 
quantities of rock salt that Council members would purchase.  
As required by the contract, Mid-American applied for 
and obtained a performance bond in the amount of 
$9,301,625.43. Based on the typical one percent fee, the bond 
cost Mid-American $93,016. The bid specifications also 
required Mid-American to fulfill rock salt orders within three 
business days. And if Mid-American failed to fulfill any order 
within five business days, members could receive 
authorization to obtain the salt from another licensed dealer. 
Mid-American would then be obligated to pay any difference 
in cost directly to the Council member. The contract also 
required Mid-American to “have adequate facilities for 
handling, storing and delivering ‘treated’ rock salt.” App. 284. 
In reliance on the estimates provided by the Council, 
Mid-American prepared to fulfill its contract obligations. It 
“imported salt from its exclusive salt mine in Mohammedia, 
Morocco,” in three separate shiploads at a total cost of 
$4,800,000. App. 233–34. Mid-American then contracted with 
DuraPort Marine and Rail Terminal in Bayonne, New Jersey, 
to stage the salt for delivery to Council members. Mid-
American paid $31,250 per month to store the salt and another 
$58,962.26 to cover it with tarps. Finally, Mid-American 
incurred at least another $220,000 in finance costs as well as 
“additional costs to rent barges and arrange for tugs, and to 
contract for trucks to deliver salt to [Council] members’ 
barns.” App. 234. 
During the 2016–17 winter season, Council Defendants 
purchased only 5,565.39 tons of rock salt, representing less 
than five percent of the estimated tonnage. Mid-American also 
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claims “several” Council members “purchased salt from Mid-
American’s competitors,” who lowered their prices after Mid-
American had been awarded the contract. App. 236. For 
example, one of Mid-American’s competitors (Atlantic Salt, 
Inc.) “reduced its price from $68.00/ton to $57.25/ton in order 
to under-bid [Mid-American’s successful] bid of $64.34/ton.” 
Id. 
II 
In June 2017, Mid-American sued the Council and 
forty-nine of its members in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey. That same month, Mid-
American filed an amended complaint alleging three counts 
against all Defendants: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) bad faith under 
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 12A:2-101, et seq.  
Four sets of responses relevant to this appeal followed. 
First, the Council moved to dismiss, claiming it was not a 
proper party because it never had any obligation to purchase 
salt. Second, the Townships of Clinton, Montgomery, and 
Readington (collectively, Townships) jointly filed a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. About twenty other townships, boroughs, and cities 
joined the Townships’ motion. Third, Wantage Township and 
the Township of Franklin (Somerset County) each filed a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of 
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Civil Procedure 12(c). Finally, seven additional townships and 
boroughs filed Rule 12(c) motions.1  
In February 2018, the District Court granted the 
Council’s and the Townships’ motions to dismiss and the 
motions for judgment on the pleadings filed by Wantage and 
Franklin. The District Court found that Mid-American’s claims 
failed as a matter of law because the company had no valid 
requirements contract with the Council or its members. Mid-
American then filed a motion for reconsideration that included 
a request for leave to amend its complaint again to add a new 
claim for promissory estoppel.  
In April 2018, the District Court denied Mid-
American’s motion for reconsideration and granted the 
motions for judgments on the pleadings filed by the seven 
Council members who had not joined in the original motions. 
Mid-American filed a timely notice of appeal from both orders.  
III 
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) because Mid-American is a citizen of 
Indiana, all Defendants are citizens of New Jersey, and the 
 
1  Some twenty Defendants settled with Mid-American 
before the District Court granted the various motions. Clinton, 
Montgomery, and Readington Townships likewise eventually 
settled, but the townships and boroughs who joined their 
motion to dismiss did not.  
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amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
IV 
A threshold issue we must decide is whether the Council 
is a proper party to Mid-American’s appeal. The Council filed 
a motion to dismiss because it was not named in the notice of 
appeal. We agree with the Council that it is not a party because 
Mid-American failed to appeal a final judgment involving the 
Council and evinced no intention to do so.  
A 
The Council argues Mid-American “neither appealed 
nor intended to appeal a district court order as to [it].” Council 
Br. 21. Mid-American claims it intended to appeal as to the 
Council all along.  
Rule 3(c)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure provides that a notice of appeal must “designate the 
judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed.” “[A]n appeal 
from a final judgment that is identified in the notice will draw 
into question all non-final orders and rulings which produced 
the judgment.” Polonski v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 137 F.3d 
139, 144 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).  
We construe notices of appeal liberally because 
“decisions on the merits are not to be avoided on grounds of 
technical violations of procedural rules.” Id. “[L]iberal 
construction does not, however, excuse noncompliance with 
[Rule 3] . . . . [N]oncompliance is fatal to an appeal.” Smith v. 
Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992). And the subjective intent of 
the parties is irrelevant because “the notice afforded by a 
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document, not the litigant’s motivation in filing it, determines 
the document’s sufficiency as a notice of appeal.” Id.  
In determining whether an unspecified order is properly 
part of an appeal, we are governed by Polonski. That case 
instructs us to 
exercise appellate jurisdiction over orders that 
are not specified in the notice of appeal where: 
(1) there is a connection between the specified 
and unspecified orders; (2) the intention to 
appeal the unspecified order is apparent; and (3) 
the opposing party is not prejudiced and has a 
full opportunity to brief the issues. 
137 F.3d at 144.  
The first and third Polonski requirements are satisfied 
here. One of the April 2018 orders specified in the notice of 
appeal bears a connection to the unspecified February 2018 
order Mid-American asks us to review as to the Council. And 
the opposing party (the Council) suffered no prejudice because 
it had a full opportunity to brief the issues. Three weeks after 
noticing the appeal, Mid-American identified the Council as a 
party to this appeal in its Civil Appeal Information Statement 
and Concise Summary of the Case. So the Council has not been 
prejudiced by the delay. The only debatable question is 
whether the Council was constructively made a party to this 
appeal in the first place through Mid-American’s “apparent 
intent.” We hold it was not. 
Mid-American made clear its intention not to appeal the 
unspecified order. Mid-American specifically asked the 
District Court not to reconsider its order granting the Council’s 
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motion to dismiss. In a footnote to the opening paragraph of its 
brief filed with its motion for reconsideration, Mid-American 
stated it was “not seeking reconsideration of the Court’s grant 
of the separate motion to dismiss filed by the [Council].” App. 
476. Although Mid-American remained free to appeal from the 
final judgment of the District Court, it chose instead to appeal 
only the two April 2018 orders. In so doing, Mid-American 
explicitly named all 24 defendants implicated by those two 
orders. Tellingly, the Council is not among the named parties.  
Mid-American now claims it intended to appeal the 
earlier order as to the Council all along. But the record 
indicates otherwise, suggesting a conscious decision by Mid-
American not to appeal the motion to dismiss as to the Council. 
No indication of Mid-American’s hidden intention surfaces 
between the April 2018 orders and the June 2018 filing of the 
Civil Appeal Information Statement and the Concise Summary 
of the Case. By that point, the deadline for filing a timely 
appeal had already passed. So we hold the Council is not a 
proper party to this appeal. 
V 
Turning to the merits, the first issue we must decide is 
whether, under New Jersey law, a valid requirements contract 
existed between Mid-American and the Council members. The 
District Court found such a contract did not exist and we agree. 
Because the contract lacked a binding promise from the 
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Council or its members to purchase all the salt they required, it 
was illusory.   
A 
We review de novo the District Court’s orders granting 
motions to dismiss and motions for judgment on the pleadings. 
Vallies v. Sky Bank, 432 F.3d 493, 494 (3d Cir. 2006); 
Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290 
(3d Cir. 1988). “A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule 
12(b)(6) should be granted only if, accepting as true the facts 
alleged and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
therefrom there is no reasonable reading upon which the 
plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Vallies, 432 F.3d at 494 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And “[u]nder 
Rule 12(c), judgment will not be granted unless the movant 
clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be 
resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
Jablonski, 863 F.2d at 290 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). As with a motion to dismiss, we view the 
facts presented and draw inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 290–91. 
B 
“To prevail on a breach of contract claim under New 
Jersey law, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) the 
existence of a valid contract between the parties; (2) failure of 
the defendant to perform its obligations under the contract; and 
(3) a causal relationship between the breach and the plaintiff’s 
alleged damages.” Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local 
Union No. 27, AFL-CIO v. E.P. Donnelly, Inc., 737 F.3d 879, 
900 (3d Cir. 2013). And “[w]here the terms of a contract are 
clear and unambiguous there is no room for interpretation or 
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construction and we must enforce those terms as written.” 
Kutzin v. Pirnie, 591 A.2d 932, 936 (N.J. 1991).  
At issue in this case is a “requirements contract.” Under 
New Jersey law, such a contract measures quantity through 
“the requirements of the buyer,” instead of through a fixed 
number stated in the contract. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-306(1). 
Requirements contracts do not need a minimum or maximum 
order set forth therein, but instead rely on “such 
actual . . . requirements as may occur in good faith, except that 
no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any stated 
estimate . . . may be tendered or demanded.” Id. The official 
comment to this section further explains:  
If an estimate of output or requirements is 
included in the agreement, no quantity 
unreasonably disproportionate to it may be 
tendered or demanded. Any minimum or 
maximum set by the agreement shows a clear 
limit on the intended elasticity. In similar 
fashion, the agreed estimate is to be regarded as 
a center around which the parties intend the 
variation to occur.  
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-306, Comment 3.  
“[A]s a general rule, [] if it is wholly optional with one 
party to a bilateral agreement whether he shall perform or not, 
there is no legal contract. The promise of that party in such a 
bargain is illusory.” G. Loewus & Co. v. Vischia, 65 A.2d 604, 
606 (N.J. 1949). In Loewus, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
considered the validity of a requirements contract for domestic 
wine, instructing that  
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[i]n passing upon the validity of contracts of this 
character the general rule is that it will be 
presumed that the parties thereto intended to 
make a binding and enforceable obligation. As 
between two equally reasonable constructions, 
we should adopt the one which makes the 
contract valid, as against that reaching a contrary 
result. 
Id. at 605–06 (citations omitted). Importantly, the contract at 
issue in Loewus included multiple provisions contemplating 
requirements and stated that “Vischia agrees to maintain at all 
times adequate equipment, staff and force of employees to 
meet the requirements of Loewus.” Id. at 605. Despite these 
promises, none of which is present in this case, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court found no valid requirements contract existed, 
largely because the buyer had agreed to purchase wine only at 
“its future election.” Id. at 606.  
Mid-American relies heavily on an intermediate 
appellate case in New Jersey that involved a cooperative 
pricing agreement for asphalt paving materials signed by the 
Council. See Tilcon New York, Inc. v. MCCPC, 2014 WL 
839122 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014). There, the Council 
and fifteen of its members were alleged to have purchased too 
much asphalt relative to their pre-bid estimates because of a 
spike in market price for asphalt cement. The asphalt 
contractors sued, seeking retroactive price increases for the 
over-bid sales. Id. at *1. Council members responded that they 
were “not obliged to purchase asphalt” under the contract, 
essentially rendering the contract illusory. Id. at *26. Although 
the court ultimately ruled for the Council members, it found 
that a valid requirements contract existed. Id. In so doing, the 
court interpreted Section 5:34-7:11(d) of the New Jersey 
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Administrative Code as requiring Council members who 
submitted pre-bid estimates to purchase asphalt consistent with 
the specifications of the contract. Id. at *26 n.22. The pertinent 
code section reads, in relevant part: “Registered members who 
submit estimates shall not issue orders and contractors shall not 
make deliveries, that deviate from the specifications or price as 
set forth in the master contract.” N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:34-
7.11(d).  
The Council responds to Tilcon with a contrary 
administrative law decision. See Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of 
Sparta, Sussex County v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Byram, 
Sussex County, 2011 WL 1843970, at *14 (N.J. Admin. 2011). 
In that case, a New Jersey Administrative Law Judge opined 
that cooperative pricing councils allow the lead agency to 
“essentially [provide] the members of the cooperative pricing 
system the availability of prices for specified items based upon 
its having carried out the advertising and bid procedures 
required by the Local Public Contracts Law.” The ALJ noted 
that, as a member of the Council, “Sparta was not required to 
purchase a specific quantity or all of its fuel oil needs from 
Finch Fuel, but had the option to purchase as little or as much 
fuel oil as it wanted.” Sparta, 2011 WL 1843970, at *3. 
Because Sparta and Tilcon cannot be reconciled and they 
include some dissimilar facts to this appeal, New Jersey 
caselaw does not answer the question presented. 
The Council members argue they entered into a valid, 
binding contract with Mid-American. Under the contract 
terms, Mid-American was required to provide bulk road salt to 
the members as needed. Yet the Council members claim no 
corresponding requirement existed for any of them to purchase 
a single pound of salt from Mid-American. In their view, the 
agreement is essentially an options contract. 
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Mid-American counters that the contract must be read 
to require Council members who submitted estimates to 
purchase all their salt needs from Mid-American. On this 
reading, the contract’s final quantity-variation provision 
relieves a member with no salt needs of any obligation to 
purchase. But that does not mean, Mid-American says, that 
members remain free to purchase salt from Mid-American’s 
competitors at discounted prices.  
Neither the general terms of the contract nor the specific 
provision Mid-American relies on support its position. Found 
in bold in the bid specifications, the quantity-variation 
provision reads: “There is no obligation to purchase that 
quantity [referring to the estimates] during the contract 
period, and the actual quantity purchased by members of 
the [Council] may vary.” App. 280. Citing the explicit 
statement “that defendants had ‘no obligation to purchase’ 
during the contract period,” the District Court observed that 
“[Mid-American’s] own pleadings and the unambiguous 
language of the contract” contradicted Mid-American’s 
contention that there was an implicit promise to purchase 
certain amounts of salt. App. 10. We agree.  
Mid-American reminds us that when faced with “two 
equally reasonable constructions” of a contract, New Jersey 
law requires us to adopt the construction that renders the 
contract valid. Loewus, 65 A.2d at 606. But we do not face two 
such constructions here because Mid-American’s construction 
of the contract is not “equally reasonable” to the Council’s. 
Unlike the contract at issue in Loewus, this contract does not 
clearly state that it is for “requirements.” Nor does it mention 
the word “exclusive,” which is another hallmark of a 
requirements contract. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-306. The 
absence of these fundamental attributes of a requirements 
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contract, when combined with the Council members’ promise 
to buy salt in such quantities “as may be desired” or as they 
“may want,” compels us to hold that the contract is illusory. 
See Loewus, 65 A.2d at 606. 
The dissent urges us to hold that under New Jersey law 
“a promise to pay for estimated quantities of required materials 
is enforceable.” Dis. Op. at 1 (emphasis added). We do not 
contest this formulation of New Jersey law. But we disagree 
with the dissent’s repeated assertions that “[C]ouncil members 
promised to pay for quantities required” in this case. Dis. Op. 
at 2. Neither the Council nor its members made such a promise 
anywhere in the contract.  
 In concluding that an enforceable promise exists here, 
the dissent relies on the estimated quantities incorporated into 
the bid proposal along with two paragraphs in “Contract #3: 
Rock Salt & Liquid Calcium Chloride.” Dis. Op. at 8–10; see 
App. 407–08.  It cites Paragraph 5 of Contract #3 to support its 
conclusion that “[C]ouncil members agreed to pay for the rock 
salt provided by Mid-American.” Dis. Op. at 9. But this 
paragraph does not contain a promise to purchase 
requirements. In full it states: 
Members of the MCCPC agree to pay 
Contractor for said work and/or materials when 
completed or delivered, as the case may be, in 
accordance with the said specifications and 
Contractor’s proposal and within the time stated 
for the actual quantity of authorized work done 
under each item scheduled by the proposal, or for 
quantities required, at the respective unit prices 




App. 408 (Contract #3 ¶ 5) (emphasis added). This paragraph 
contemplates payment based either on the “actual quantity of 
authorized work done” or for “quantities required.” Id. In this 
case, Council members placed few orders for rock salt and they 
paid according to the “actual quantity” of salt purchased. The 
language of this paragraph expressly allows for such a scenario 
through the use of the disjunctive “or.”  It likewise bears 
repeating that the referenced bid specifications and proposal 
nowhere state that a requirements contract is being formed.  
 The dissent’s argument that the use of “or” in Paragraph 
5 is not “fatal to enforceability,” Dis. Op. at 12, is beside the 
point. In urging us to interpret that Paragraph as providing 
options for calculating payment amount, the dissent essentially 
claims that since a requirements contract already exists here, 
the payment amount is calculated based on the “quantities 
required” provision. Id. (“But if the contract is for 
requirements, then the payment amount will be determined by 
‘unit bid prices.’”) (citation omitted). This interpretation is 
inconsistent with the dissent’s own reliance on this very same 
paragraph to establish that a requirements contract exists in the 
first place. See Dis. Op. at 9–10 (citing Paragraph 5).2 
 
2 The only other reference to requirements is Paragraph 
3 of Contract #3, which discusses Mid-American’s obligations 
under the contract—not the Council members. See App. 407 
(Contract #3 ¶ 3) (“The contractor will furnish said material 
required as stated in the bid proposal at anytime during the term 
of the Contract . . . .”). This provision did not create a 




Finally, we note these are sophisticated parties capable 
of entering into precisely the kind of contract they desire. It 
would have been easy to, for example, insert a simple provision 
stating, “This is a contract for rock salt requirements and the 
Council covenants to purchase (and pay for) its rock salt 
requirements from the Contractor.” Even merely titling this a 
“Requirements Contract” would have indicated to us that a 
requirements contract was, in fact, being formed. But that is 
not the contract we have before us and we will not rewrite the 
bargain for the parties.  
In sum, neither the Council nor its members ever 
promised to purchase from Mid-American all the rock salt they 
required. And their promise to pay for any rock salt they might 
have purchased—a rather obvious proposition—does not 
oblige them to actually purchase anything. Nor can the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, see Dis. Op. at 5 (citing 
Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575 (N.J. 
1997)), supply a promise that was never made. Because Mid-
American promised to supply rock salt requirements to the 
Council and its members without obtaining a corresponding 
promise in return, we hold that the contract is illusory. 
 
proposal does not contain a promise to purchase requirements 
and expressly disclaims any intention to bind Council members 
to estimates “as stated in the bid proposal.” Id. Second, we 
agree that the contract obligated Mid-American to provide rock 
salt at the Council members’ request. But the lack of a 
corresponding promise by the Council or its members to 
purchase its rock salt requirements from Mid-American is what 




Finally, we must decide whether the District Court 
properly denied Mid-American’s motion for reconsideration. 
In that motion, Mid-American also requested leave to amend 
its complaint to include a promissory estoppel claim.  
A 
We review the District Court’s order denying a motion 
for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. N. River Ins. Co. v. 
CIGNA Reins. Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1203 (3d Cir. 1995). The 
same standard applies to our review of the order denying Mid-
American’s motion to amend its complaint. Lake v. Arnold, 
232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000). 
B 
In denying the motion for reconsideration, the District 
Court also denied Mid-American’s request for leave to amend 
its complaint. Mid-American had requested leave to include a 
claim for promissory estoppel. It admits that it “arguably 
should have filed a separate motion to amend,” but nonetheless 
claims its request was improperly denied. Mid-American Br. 
55 n.14. 
Motions for reconsideration exist to “correct manifest 
errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” 
Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). 
Amendments to pre-trial pleadings that do not qualify for 
amendment as a matter of course are governed by Rule 15(a)(2) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These amendments 
require leave from the court, which “should freely give leave 
when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). “[A] district 
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court must permit a curative amendment unless such an 
amendment would be inequitable or futile,” particularly where 
“a complaint is vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Phillips v. 
Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236, 245 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(citation omitted).  
In its denial of leave to amend, the District Court noted 
that “[r]econsideration motions . . . may not be used 
to . . . raise arguments or present evidence that could have been 
raised prior to the entry of judgment.” App. 16 (citing NL 
Indus., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 
516 (D.N.J. 1996)). It concluded that as a “sophisticated 
business entity with competent counsel,” Mid-American chose 
not to raise a claim for promissory estoppel in its complaint. 
Id. Mid-American was thus precluded from using its later 
motion for reconsideration to advance that claim. Id.  
The District Court was correct to conclude that a motion 
for reconsideration was the improper vehicle for Mid-
American’s request for leave to amend. Mid-American had 
ample opportunity to request leave to assert a claim for 
promissory estoppel prior to the entry of judgment, but decided 
not to. It was precluded from later seeking to advance that 
claim through a motion for reconsideration after a final 
judgment. See Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic 
Assoc. II PC, 935 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that 
seeking leave to amend a complaint after judgment would 
require also moving to set aside the judgment under Rules 
59(e) or 60).  
Even had Mid-American properly requested leave to 
assert a claim for promissory estoppel, such a claim would 
have been futile. We have held the contract illusory, so the 
Council members never made a “clear and definite promise” to 
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purchase any salt from Mid-American.  Toll Bros., Inc. v. Bd. 
of Chosen Freeholders of the Cty. of Burlington, 944 A.2d 1, 
19 (N.J. 2008) (citation omitted). The District Court did not err 
when it denied Mid-American leave to amend its complaint. 
* * * 
In sum, no valid requirements contract for bulk rock salt 
existed here because the contract was illusory. And because 
Mid-American’s proposed new cause of action was 
procedurally improper and futile in any event, the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mid-American’s 
motion for reconsideration. We will affirm the orders of the 
District Court.  
PHIPPS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
This case hinges on a question of state substantive law: 
whether a promise to pay for estimated quantities of required 
materials is enforceable.  In interpreting New Jersey law,1 the 
Majority Opinion holds that such a promise does not suffice to 
form a requirements contract.  Instead, the Majority Opinion 
conditions the enforceability of a requirements contract on an 
express promise to purchase – not merely to pay for – 
requirements.  I disagree and believe that when a promise to 
pay for requirements is accompanied by estimated quantities 
of required materials, New Jersey law recognizes the formation 
of a binding requirements contract.   
Here, several New Jersey counties and municipalities, 
as members of a cooperative pricing council, solicited bids to 
supply their annual rock salt needs, and they provided 
estimates of their annual rock salt requirements.  Mid-
American Salt LLC submitted a bid, and the council awarded 
a contract to Mid-American.  Through that contract, which 
incorporated the council members’ estimates of their rock salt 
 
1  As a case filed in New Jersey federal court premised on 
diversity jurisdiction, New Jersey’s choice-of-law rules 
determine governing substantive law.  See Liggon-Reading v. 
Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 262 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)); Chin v. 
Chrysler LLC, 538 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2008).  Under those 
rules, parties to a contract may specify the substantive law that 
will govern their agreement.  See Collins v. Mary Kay, Inc., 
874 F.3d 176, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2017).  And here, the parties 
agreed to “be governed by the laws of the State of New Jersey.”  
General Conditions and Instruction to Bidders (JA306).  
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requirements, Mid-American promised to furnish the council 
members with their rock salt requirements, and the council 
members promised to pay for quantities required.   
The Majority Opinion views the council members’ 
promise to pay for rock salt as imposing no obligation on them 
to purchase their required rock salt from Mid-American.  But 
as I see it, the council members’ good faith estimates of their 
rock salt needs, coupled with their promise to pay for quantities 
required, obligated them to purchase rock salt from Mid-
American in quantities reasonably proportionate to the 
estimates.  Because the council members did not do so, I would 
reverse the District Court’s judgment dismissing Mid-
American’s three-count complaint against the council and its 
members. 
I. Under New Jersey Law, a Promise to Pay for 
Estimated Quantities of Required Materials Is 
Enforceable. 
Not all promises are enforceable.  See E. Allan 
Farnsworth, Contracts 12 (2d ed. 1990) (“No legal system has 
even been reckless enough to make all promises 
enforceable.”).  For a promise to be enforceable, there must be 
consideration.  See Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 800 A.2d 872, 
878 (N.J. 2002) (“Basic contract principles render a promise 
enforceable against the promisor if the promisee gave some 
consideration for the promise.”).2  In relying on the 
 
2  See also Shebar v. Sanyo Business Sys. Corp., 544 A.2d 377, 
383 (N.J. 1988) (describing consideration as an “essential 
requirement” of a contract); Kilborn v. Pyne, 279 F. 864, 866 
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court has defined consideration as having a procedural 
component (bargaining) and a substantive component (an act, 
forbearance, or other alteration of a legal relationship): 
The essential requirement of 
consideration is a bargained-for exchange of 
promises or performance that may consist of an 
act, a forbearance, or the creation, modification, 
or destruction of a legal relation.  If the 
consideration requirement is met, there is no 
additional requirement of gain or benefit to the 
promisor, loss or detriment to the promisee, 
equivalence in the values exchanged, or 
mutuality of obligation. 
Shebar, 544 A.2d at 383 (citations omitted); see also 
Martindale, 800 A.2d at 878; Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 71 (October 2019 update). 
The adequacy of consideration poses a question of some 
depth in the context of a requirements contract.  Such a contract 
traditionally involves a promise to purchase all specified goods 
or services required for a certain period at a certain price.3  
 
(3d Cir. 1922) (“A promise without consideration is not 
enforceable.”).   
3  See generally Black’s Law Dictionary 1468 (4th ed. 1968) 
(defining a “requirement contract” as “a contract in writing in 
whereby one agrees to buy, for a sufficient consideration, all 
of the merchandise of a designated type which the buyer may 
require for use in his own established business”). 
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Although such contracts are unquestionably bargained for, the 
issue is whether that promise is substantive or illusory.4  As 
this Circuit once observed about requirements contracts, albeit 
in the context of Pennsylvania law, without a duty of good 
faith, the buyer’s promise is generally illusory because “the 
buyer in a requirements contract has no duty to have any 
requirements.”  Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v. Anchor 
Hocking Glass Corp., 130 F.2d 471, 473 (3d Cir. 1942).   
At common law, New Jersey was similarly hesitant to 
recognize the enforceability of requirements contracts due to 
concerns about the absence of adequate consideration.  Most 
notably, the New Jersey Supreme Court in G. Loewus & Co. v. 
Vischia, 65 A.2d 604 (N.J. 1949), held that a requirements 
contract that lacked “a reasonably accurate estimate” of the 
supplies needed was not enforceable.  Id. at 606.  There, a wine 
distributor agreed with a winery “to place orders . . . from time 
to time for such wine as it may require under labels bearing 
brand or trade names which are its exclusive property.”  Id. at 
604-05 (emphasis added).  Without an estimated-quantity 
provision, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the 
winery’s promise to place orders for required quantities did not 
constitute adequate consideration because it was “left to 
depend for its very existence upon its future election.”  Id. at 
606.   
 
4 See generally 2 Corbin on Contracts § 5.28 (“If what appears 
to be a promise is an illusion, there is no promise . . . Such an 
illusory promise is neither enforceable against the one making 
it, nor is it operative as a consideration for a return promise.  
Thus, if there is no other consideration for a return promise, the 
result is that no contract is created.”).   
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Subsequently, in 1961, New Jersey adopted a modified 
version of the Uniform Commercial Code, which refined the 
consideration needed for requirements contracts.  See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 12A:2-306(1).  Under the now-governing statutory 
provision, the enforceability of a requirements contract rests on 
a duty of good faith: 
A term which measures the quantity by … 
the requirements of the buyer means such actual 
. . . requirements as may occur in good faith, 
except that no quantity unreasonably 
disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the 
absence of a stated estimate to any normal or 
otherwise comparable prior … requirements may 
be tendered or demanded. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. § 12A:1-201(b)(20) 
(defining “good faith” generally as meaning “honesty in fact 
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing”); Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575, 
587 (N.J. 1997) (“[E]very contract in New Jersey contains an 
implied covenant of good faith and faith dealing.”). 
Under that formulation, the duty of good faith acts as a 
ballast to steady an otherwise uncertain promise so that a 
requirements contract does not lack adequate consideration.5  
 
5 See 2 Corbin on Contracts § 6.5 (“Under a requirements 
contract, the buyer retains a great deal of discretion as to the 
quantity ordered but the discretion must be exercised in good 
faith.  The obligation of good faith is a limit on the buyer’s 
freedom of action and prevents the promise to buy from being 
illusory.”).   
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As explained by the official statutory comments, which carry 
persuasive force under New Jersey law,6 a requirements 
contract is enforceable because “the party who will determine 
quantity is required to operate his plant or conduct his business 
in good faith and according to commercial standards of fair 
dealing in the trade so that his . . . requirements will 
approximate a reasonably foreseeable figure.”  See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 12A:2-306 cmt. 2.  Thus, due to the implicit duty of 
good faith, requirements contracts are enforceable in New 
Jersey.   
But nothing about New Jersey’s statutory formulation 
suggests that the identification of estimated quantities of 
required materials has gone from the missing ingredient for 
adequate consideration, see G. Loewus, 65 A.2d at 606, to 
illusions.  To the contrary, estimated quantities of required 
materials enhance the adequacy of consideration consistent 
with the duty of good faith because those estimates serve as 
benchmarks for assessing breach: “the agreed estimate is to be 
regarded as a center around which the parties intend the 
variation to occur.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A: 2-306 cmt. 3; see 
generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principles of 
Consideration, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 640, 640 (1982) (positing 
that “theories of enforceability must focus heavily on 
appropriate measures of damages”).   
Although sparse, subsequent New Jersey judicial and 
administrative decisions do not diminish the significance of 
estimated quantities in requirements contracts.  The most 
recent and on-point case, an unreported decision from the 
 




Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court, held that 
a requirements contract containing estimated quantities was 
enforceable.  See Tilcon N.Y., Inc. v. Morris Cty. Coop. Pricing 
Council, 2014 WL 839122 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 5, 
2014).  In construing that contract for estimated quantities of 
asphalt, that decision held that “implicit in [the] submission of 
estimates was a promise to purchase amounts approximately 
equal to those estimates.”  Id. at *27. 
Even decisions finding promises unenforceable do not 
negate the importance of estimated quantities.  In one case, the 
parties agreed to price terms for the delivery of concrete for a 
specific construction project.  See Loizeaux Builders Supply 
Co. v. Donald B. Ludwig Co., 366 A.2d 721, 723 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 1976).  But the purchaser did not identify 
estimated quantities of concrete.  See id. at 723-24.  Nor did 
the purchaser promise to buy the concrete required for the job.  
See id. at 723.  In holding that such an arrangement was not a 
binding contract, the Superior Court did not touch upon, much 
less disturb, the principle that estimated quantities add 
dimension to otherwise uncertain promises for requirements.   
The unreported administrative ruling cited by the 
Majority Opinion does not call into doubt that principle.  See 
Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Sparta, Sussex, Cty., v. Bd. of Educ. 
of the Twp. of Byram, Sussex Cty., 2011 WL 1843970 (N.J. 
Admin. May 13, 2011).  That decision refused to enforce a joint 
purchasing agreement between school districts for fuel oil.  Id. 
at *3, 20.  But the primary reasons for that outcome had nothing 
to do with estimated quantities of required fuel oil.  See id. at 
*18.  Rather, the contract was unenforceable because the lead 
contracting agency “failed to create and register a cooperative 
purchasing system,” and that agency “did not prepare and enter 
into a written joint purchasing agreement . . . in accordance 
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with the statutory and regulatory requirements.”  Id.  As a 
tertiary rationale, the administrative ruling relied on the 
correspondence between the parties that did not identify 
required quantities of fuel oil but instead listed only the “size 
and number of [the] fuel oil tanks.”  Id. at *19.  The 
identification of nothing more than storage capacity differs 
significantly from a specific estimate of annual quantities of 
required materials.  
From these authorities, I interpret New Jersey law as 
allowing parties to form an enforceable requirements contract 
through an identification of estimated quantities of required 
materials, together with promises to furnish and pay for 
requirements. 
II. The Council Members’ Promise to Pay for 
Estimated Quantities of Required Rock Salt Is 
Enforceable. 
The members of the cooperative pricing council entered 
a binding contract for their rock salt requirements.  As part of 
their bid specifications, the council members provided 
estimated quantities of “Bulk Rock Salt, Delivered by Truck, 
Unloaded by Bidder.”  Bid Specifications at 3, 9-13 (JA282, 
288-92); see also Notification of Award at 2 (JA414).7  For 
 
7 See N.J. Admin Code § 5:34-7.2 (defining a “cooperative 
pricing system” as “a purchasing system in which a local 
contracting unit advertises for bids and awards a master 
contract to a successful vendor for its own quantities and the 
estimated quantities submitted by the individual registered 
members” (emphasis added)); see generally N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 40A:11-11(5) (providing for cooperative pricing systems). 
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purposes of awarding the contract on a county-by-county basis, 
those estimated quantities were aggregated into bid proposals 
at the county level, to achieve lower prices through a volume 
discount.8  From those estimates, Mid-American submitted a 
qualifying bid, and the council awarded it a contract to deliver 
bulk rock salt to council members within five counties.  The 
contract memorialized Mid-American’s promises to furnish 
the required materials as estimated by the council members’ 
bid proposals: 
[Mid-American] will furnish said 
material required as stated in the bid proposal at 
anytime during the term of the Contract. 
Contract #3: Rock Salt & Liquid Calcium Chloride ¶ 3 (JA407) 
(emphasis added).  In return, the council members agreed to 
pay for the rock salt provided by Mid-American in fulfillment 
of those requirements: 
[Council members] agree to pay [Mid-
American] for said work and/or materials when 
completed or delivered, as the case may be . . . 
 
8 See Tilcon, 2014 WL 839122, at *27 (“The underlying goal 
of the statute authorizing cooperative pricing systems is to 
enable local governments to obtain favorable prices by pooling 
their purchasing power and securing prices that reflect quantity 
discounts and sellers’ economies of scale.  Potential bidders 
would be less likely to offer quantity-based discounts if 
members could submit estimates, but avoid the contract price 
of goods entirely if market prices fell, and enforce the contract 
price if market prices rose.”). 
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for quantities required, at the respective unit 
prices bid therefore by [Mid-American]. 
Id. ¶ 5 (JA 408) (emphasis added). 
But after that award, council members in those counties 
bought either no rock salt from Mid-American or amounts 
dramatically less than the quantities estimated.    Collectively, 
the council members in those counties purchased less than 5% 
of the estimated combined total of bulk rock salt from Mid-
American.   
On these allegations, Mid-American’s complaint should 
not have been dismissed.  Mid-American plausibly alleges 
adequate consideration – a bargained-for exchange of 
enforceable promises.  The parties bargained for the rock salt 
contract through a formal process.  The council members 
published a bid package, which included a notice to bidders, an 
invitation to bid, bid specifications, and bid proposals 
containing estimated quantities of rock salt.  Mid-American 
submitted a bid, and the council issued a formal notice of award 
to Mid-American.  Then Mid-American and the council signed 
a contract for rock salt.  That contract incorporated the council 
members’ estimates and contained Mid-American’s promise to 
furnish the council members’ rock salt requirements, which 
they would request through purchase orders.  Finally, and most 
relevant here, the contract included the council members’ 
promise to pay for the rock salt they received from Mid-
American.  In this context, in which council members 
submitted estimated quantities of their annual rock salt needs 
and Mid-American promised to meet those needs, the council 
members’ promise to pay for the rock salt furnished by Mid-
American should be enforceable.   
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Thus, unlike the Majority Opinion, I understand the 
parties to have formed a binding requirements contract.  That 
agreement obligated council members, consistent with the duty 
of good faith, to purchase quantities of rock salt reasonably 
proportionate to their estimates.  Because they did not, Mid-
American should have been permitted to proceed with its three-
count complaint and pursue, among other things, damages for 
purchase amounts that were “unreasonably disproportionate” 
to the council members’ estimates.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A: 2-
306(1).   
III. No Other Provisions of the Contract Render It 
Unenforceable. 
In reaching a different conclusion, the Majority Opinion 
relies primarily on the absence of express promise by the 
council members to purchase their required rock salt from 
Mid-American.  Maj. Op. at 19.  The Majority Opinion also 
relies on two components of the council members’ bid 
specifications: the no-minimum-order clause and the quantity-
variation provisions.  I see it differently. 
A. The Promise to Pay for Requirements, When 
Accompanied by Estimated Quantities, Is 
Enforceable. 
The Majority Opinion refuses to enforce this contract 
because it “does not contain a promise to purchase 
requirements.”  Maj. Op. at 19.  That is the nub of our 
disagreement.  The Majority Opinion insists that a 
requirements contract must contain an express promise to 
purchase requirements.  But as I understand New Jersey law, 
due to the centrality of the duty of good faith, a promise to pay 
for requirements becomes enforceable when it is accompanied 
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by estimated quantities of required materials.  See G. Loewus, 
65 A.2d at 606; Tilcon, 2014 WL 839122, at *27.  Both a 
promise to pay for requirements and an identification of 
estimated quantities are present here.  See Contract #3: Rock 
Salt & Liquid Calcium Chloride ¶¶ 3, 5 (JA407-08).  And 
because that promise resulted from a bargaining process in 
which Mid-American promised to furnish requirements, I 
believe that the parties entered an enforceable requirements 
contract. 
Nor is the disjunctive ‘or’ in the pay-for clause fatal to 
enforceability.  Cf. Maj. Op. at 20.  The options in that clause 
relate to different methods for calculating payment amount.  If 
the contract specifies the quantity supplied, then the payment 
amount will be “in accordance with the said specification and 
the Contractor’s proposal.”  Contract #3: Rock Salt & Liquid 
Calcium Chloride ¶ 5 (JA408).  But if the contract is for 
requirements, then the payment amount will be determined by 
“unit bid prices.”  Id.  Tellingly, the contract with Mid-
American uses exclusively unit pricing – in further 
confirmation that it is a requirements contract.  See Notice of 
Award at 2 (JA414) (specifying unit prices for Category I Bulk 
Rock Salt).  But especially under New Jersey’s presumption in 
favor of contract formation,9 any perceived ambiguity in this 
 
9 See Silverstein v. Keane, 115 A.2d 1, 6 (N.J. 1955) (“The 
general rule of construction of contracts pertinent to 
[questions involving mutuality of obligation] is that it will be 
presumed that the parties thereto intended to make a binding 
and enforceable obligation and as between two equally 
reasonable constructions the court should adopt the one which 
makes the contract valid as opposed to one reaching a 
contrary result.” (citing G. Loweus, 65 A.2d at 604)); see also 
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clause should not obliterate the enforceability of this 
bargained-for agreement.   
B. The No-Minimum-Order Clause Does Not 
Negate Consideration.  
The contract does not contain a specific delivery 
schedule for rock salt, but that does not destroy its 
enforceability.  Instead of a delivery schedule, the contract sets 
forth a process for buying rock salt through individual purchase 
orders.  See Contract #3: Rock Salt & Liquid Calcium Chloride 
¶ 3 (JA407) (“Members of the MCCPC may purchase items 
pursuant to the Contract by issuance of purchase orders.”).  
Submission of a purchase order imposes certain obligations on 
Mid-American, such as delivery location10 and delivery time,11 
 
2 Corbin on Contracts § 5.28 (“The tendency of the law is to 
avoid the finding that no contract arose due to an illusory 
promise when it appears that the parties intended a 
contract.”).   
10  Bid Specifications at 1 (JA280) (“Delivery locations shall 
be to participating members of the MCCPC as specified at the 
time of ordering.”). 
11  Id. (“Delivery for all categories is to be made to the members 
of the MCCPC within three (3) business days of receipt of 
order. . . .”). 
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as well as consequences for failing to make the delivery as 
specified.12 
The no-minimum-order clause is a critical feature of the 
purchase-order process.  That clause generally prohibits Mid-
American from imposing a minimum order requirement on 
council members: “No minimum order requirements are 
allowed, unless stated otherwise elsewhere.”  Bid 
Specifications at 1 (JA280).  Through that provision, the 
members of the cooperative pricing council have flexibility to 
submit individual purchase orders in any amount (unless 
otherwise specified), but the clause does not release them from 
their estimated annual totals.   
The operation of this clause can be explained through 
example.  Suppose, for instance, that a council member 
estimated a delivery amount of 100 tons of rock salt for the 
year.  Through the no-minimum order clause, unless the 
contract provided otherwise, that member could reach that total 
through five deliveries of twenty tons, ten deliveries of ten 
tons, a hundred deliveries of one ton, or any other combination.  
But that flexibility for each individual order would not absolve 
a council member of its obligation to purchase an estimated 
annual total of 100 tons of rock salt. 
 
12  Id. at 1-2 (JA280-81) (“Scheduled deliveries must be 
adhered to or rescheduled by 3:00 p.m. the day before the 
scheduled delivery[,] [or Mid-American shall face] [a] ten 
percent (10%) penalty of the total order. . . [F]ailure to accept 
orders and/or failure to comply with delivery requirements 
three (3) or more times shall constitute an act of default. . . .”). 
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The Majority Opinion interprets the no-minimum-order 
clause to mean that the council members do not need to make 
any purchases throughout the year.  See Maj. Op. at 18 
(interpreting the non-minimum-order clause as “reliev[ing] a 
member with no salt needs of any obligation to purchase”).  But 
the no-minimum-order clause and the promise to purchase 
estimated annual quantities are separate terms.  I therefore 
disagree with the Majority Opinion and point out two 
additional concerns.  
In my view, the Majority Opinion places undue 
significance on the no-minimum-order clause – so much so that 
the clause would overtake promises to purchase fixed 
quantities of rock salt.  Suppose the same agreement except 
that the council members agreed to purchase exact quantities 
of rock salt.  Would the no-minimum-order clause also render 
that agreement illusory?  No, it would not.  The process for 
submitting individual purchase orders is distinct from an 
obligation to purchase annual quantities.  Yet under the 
Majority Opinion, a no-minimum-order clause, even in a 
contract specifying fixed annual quantities, would render the 
contract unenforceable.  I find no support in New Jersey law 
for that unsettling proposition. 
I also do not see the Majority Opinion as accounting for 
the contract’s specified exception to the no-minimum-order 
clause.  Mid-American cannot impose minimum order 
requirements “unless stated otherwise elsewhere.”  Bid 
Specifications at 1 (JA280).   But this contract stated – through 
the council members’ own bid specifications – that the 
minimum order for delivered bulk rock salt was 25 tons.13  If 
 
13  See Bid Specifications at 3 (JA282) (“Deliveries must be 
made in truckloads of 25 tons or more.); see also Bid Proposal 
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nothing else, under the Majority Opinion’s reasoning, that 25-
ton minimum order amount should be enforceable. 
For these reasons, I disagree with the Majority 
Opinion’s reading of the no-minimum-order clause.   
C. The Quantity-Variation Provisions Do Not 
Undermine Consideration.  
In holding that the council members’ promise is 
illusory, the Majority Opinion relies heavily on the contract’s 
quantity-variation provisions.  Those all reinforce the same 
principle, i.e., that the annual required quantities are estimates:  
 This is an Open-Ended contract, meaning 
all items are specified with an estimated 
quantity.   
 There is no obligation to purchase that 
quantity during the contract period, and 
the actual quantity purchased by 
members of the MCCPC may vary.   
 All quantities may be more or less than 
estimated.   
 
Form for Hunterdon County at 1 (JA321), (specifying that rock 
salt was to be delivered by truck “in 25 ton lots”); Bid Proposal 
Form for Passaic County at 1 (JA327) (same); Bid Proposal 
Form for Somerset County at 1 (JA330) (same); Bid Proposal 
Form for Sussex County at 1 (JA333) (same); Bid Proposal 
Form for Union County at 1 (JA336) (same).   
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Bid Specifications at 1 (JA280) (emphasis added).  And as I 
understand New Jersey law, the presence of estimated 
quantities does not weaken but instead enhances the 
enforceability of a requirements contract.  See G. Loewus, 
65 A.2d at 606; Tilcon, 2014 WL 839122, at *27.   
The first quantity-variation term, the open-ended 
provision, does not undermine enforceability.  If promises for 
open-ended required quantities were fatal to enforceability, 
then all requirements contracts would be illusory.  See 
generally 2 Corbin on Contracts § 6.5 (“In a requirements 
contract, the quantity term is not fixed at the time of 
contracting.”).  But that is not the rule in New Jersey, where an 
open-ended promise for requirements, coupled with the duty of 
good faith, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-306(1), or even with “a 
reasonably accurate estimate” of the quantity to be purchased, 
G. Loewus, 65 A.2d at 606, may constitute adequate 
consideration.   
The next provision – which underscores that council 
members need not purchase the quantities estimated – similarly 
does not reflect a phantom promise as the Majority Opinion 
suggests.  See Maj. Op. at 18-19 (characterizing “the Council 
members’ promise” as a promise “to buy salt in such quantities 
‘as may be desired’ or as they ‘may want’”).14  That clause 
 
14  See also 2 Corbin on Contracts § 6.5 (“[In a requirements 
contract], the buyer’s promise is not illusory and it is, if 
bargained for, consideration for a return promise.  It is not a 
promise to buy all that the buyer wishes or may thereafter 
choose to order.  The amount is not left exclusively to the will 
of the promisor . . . [Instead,] [the contract] states a limitation 
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makes clear that the estimated quantities are just that: 
estimates, as opposed to fixed, certain amounts.  If anything, 
this clause’s reference to “actual quantity purchased,” 
evidences the understanding that council members would 
purchase some actual quantity of rock salt.  Certainly, a 
promise to purchase actual quantities is not an illusion. 
The same holds true for the final quantity-variation 
provision that “[a]ll quantities may be more or less than 
estimated.”  Particularly in light of the duty of good faith, that 
clause presupposes the purchase of some non-zero quantity of 
rock salt.  And if the promise were merely an illusion, then that 
clause would have stated that ‘there is no obligation to make 
any purchase’ – not that “all quantities” purchased may vary.   
* * * 
Under New Jersey substantive law, a promise to pay for 
an estimated quantity of a required materials is enforceable.  
The contract at issue contained such a promise, and thus Mid-
American’s lawsuit should not have been dismissed.15 
 
upon the promisor’s future liberty of action.  The promisor no 
longer has an unlimited option.”). 
15  I also disagree with the Majority Opinion’s conclusion that 
the Morris County Cooperative Pricing Council should be 
dismissed as a party to this appeal.   
Rule 3 of Federal Appellate Procedure does not demand that a 
notice of appeal identify each appellee.  Instead, it requires the 
appealing party to (A) specify the party or parties taking the 
appeal; (B) designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being 
 
appealed; and (C) identify the court to which the appeal is 
taken.  See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c).  The notice of appeal – even 
without listing the council specifically – satisfies requirements 
(A) and (C).  For subpart (B), I see no uncertainty about which 
order Mid-American appeals: the District Court granted only 
one contested motion by the council.  Mid-American should 
not be faulted for not seeking reconsideration of that ruling 
because reconsideration does not operate as an exhaustion 
requirement for a valid appeal.  And other than this case, I am 
unaware of any decision that has invalidated a notice of appeal 
due to a footnote in a separate motion for reconsideration.  By 
contrast, precedent is replete with exhortations to “liberally 
construe[] notices of appeal.”  Trzaska v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 
865 F.3d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Sulima v. 
Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2010)); 
see also Polonski v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 137 F.3d 139, 
144 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining that prior court orders are 
merged into the final judgment for purposes of appeal).  For 
these reasons, the council should be a party to this appeal.   
